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INTRODUCTION: TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
At the level of international law, the concept of ‘traditional knowledge’ as an object of protection of 
some type has a long, if not always illustrious, history.  Amongst the most important of the 
international instruments that contribute to this history is the 1989 UNESCO Recommendation on 
the Safeguarding of Traditional Culture and Folklore.  In fact, the expression ‘traditional knowledge’ 
does not appear in this instrument.  Rather, the Recommendation refers interchangeably to ‘folklore’ 
and ‘traditional and popular culture’, which it defines as ‘the totality of tradition-based creations of a 
cultural community, expressed by a group or individuals and recognised as reflecting the expectations 
of a community in so far as they reflect its cultural and social identity’.  Specifically, for the purposes 
of the Recommendation, ‘traditional and popular culture’ includes, in a widely drafted list, ‘language, 
literature, music, dance, games, mythology, rituals, customs, handicrafts, architecture and other arts’.  
So far as the protection of this ‘folklore’ or ‘traditional and popular culture’ is concerned, the 
Recommendation makes a somewhat ambiguous reference to the possibility, amongst others, of its 
protection through intellectual property devices and to the ‘important work’ on this question being 
undertaken under the joint auspices of UNESCO and WIPO.  This reference to the possible role of 
intellectual property law in the protection of so-called traditional knowledge is a central concern of 
this chapter. 
The 1989 UNESCO Recommendation is, in some senses, a precursor to the UNESCO Convention 
for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of 2003.  The Convention clearly reflects a 
number of important themes in the Recommendation and, in fact, makes its debt in this respect quite 
clear by way of a preambular reference.  As in the Recommendation, the expression ‘traditional 
knowledge’ is not to be found in the Convention.  Instead, as its name suggests it focuses on intangible 
cultural heritage, which it defines in Article 2.1 as ‘the practices, representations, expressions, 
knowledge, skills – as well as the instruments, objects, artefacts and cultural spaces associated 
therewith – that communities, groups and, in some cases individuals, recognize as part of their cultural 
heritage’.  In a similar way to the Recommendation, it also draws attention to the role of intangible 
cultural heritage in creating and reflecting community identity.  There are, however, are a number of 
significant differences between the two instruments.  For the purposes of this chapter, one of them is 
that the Convention seems less interested in the possible role of intellectual property as a mode of 
protecting intangible cultural heritage.  Its only mention of intellectual property is in Article 3(b), 
which makes it clear that the Convention does not affects rights ‘deriving from any international 
instrument relating to intellectual property’.  At least implicitly, this provision might be said to draw 
a distinction between the forms of protection with which it is concerned, and the concept of private 
property protection through intellectual property devices.  At the same time, it confirms the possibility 
of an overlap in the objects of protection of these two legal forms. 
The first international instrument in which the expression ‘traditional knowledge’ appears is the 
UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions of 
2005, which makes reference in its preambles to ‘the importance of traditional knowledge as a source 
of intangible and material wealth, and in particular the knowledge systems of indigenous peoples, 
and its positive contribution to sustainable development, as well as the need for its adequate protection 
and promotion’.  The reference to the traditional knowledge of indigenous peoples is not without 
significance in this context.  In fact, much of the international debate around this question has been 
focussed on the traditional knowledge of indigenous peoples.  This aspect of the debate has also found 
expression in the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples of 2007 (the so called DRIPs).  
According to the DRIPs, Article 31, the rights of indigenous peoples in their ‘cultural heritage, 
traditional knowledge, and traditional cultural expressions’ include the right to protect it in the form 
of intellectual property. 
Putting these various introductory comments together, it can be seen that the debate around the 
treatment of traditional knowledge in international law has coalesced around two premises, which are 
investigated in this chapter: first, that the protection of traditional knowledge is primarily a question 
of the rights of indigenous peoples; and, secondly, that the form of the protection of traditional 
knowledge is primarily a question of intellectual property law. 
 
TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE AS A QUESTION OF THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS 
PEOPLES? 
In relation to the first of these two underlying premises, that the protection of traditional knowledge 
primarily relates to the rights of indigenous peoples, the chapter unequivocally accepts that the 
question of the just treatment of indigenous peoples is one of great importance.  Indigenous peoples 
have suffered, and continue to suffer, grave injustices in the post-colonial period.  In international 
law indigenous peoples are communities with a common cultural and political identity, but without 
having legal identity as a state.  Without the legal identity that comes from the privilege of statehood 
indigenous peoples are not part of the community of international law makers.  For indigenous groups, 
therefore, the question of the right to control cultural heritage, including traditional knowledge, is 
linked to questions of identity, survival and the political project of self-determination, in a world that 
is dominated by the Westphalian state-based system of sovereignty and law-making (Macmillan 
2013). This, of course, suggests that a just response to the claims of indigenous peoples requires 
something more than simply the protection of their cultural heritage.  In fact, the focus of the debate 
on questions such as the traditional knowledge of indigenous peoples seems calculated to distract 
attention from much more pressing political claims.   
At the same time, this focus also distracts from the undoubted fact that it is not only indigenous 
peoples that have traditional knowledge.  This fact has not entirely escaped attention at the 
international legal level.  The definition of intangible cultural heritage in the 2003 UNESCO 
Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage makes this reasonably clear by 
its reference to the “knowledge … that communities, groups and, in some cases, individuals recognize 
as part of their cultural heritage”.  And, this is confirmed by the representative list of the intangible 
cultural heritage of humanity established under the 2003 UNESCO Convention, which contains 
examples of traditional knowledge of communities other than those regarded as indigenous peoples 
under international law.  However, the effectiveness of this Convention in protecting the intangible 
cultural heritage of communities in questionable.  There are two reasons for this: one is connected 
with the statist nature of international law, and the other is a consequence of the fact that the 
Convention does not unambiguously constitute protection per se for its listed intangible cultural 
heritage. 
So far as the statist nature of international law is concerned, inclusion in this list is a form of 
recognition of traditional knowledge in relation to which a state is making some sort of claim.  Such 
a claim does not necessarily entail the recognition of communities not forming a state in international 
law.  Further, the Convention has no mechanism to allow communities forming less than a state to 
list intangible cultural heritage to which they wish to make a claim.  Although states are obliged to 
include ‘communities, groups and relevant non-governmental organizations’ (Article 11(b)) in the 
process of identifying their intangible cultural heritage, all entries to the Convention’s lists of 
intangible cultural heritage are made through state channels.   In formal terms, this is as much as an 
issue for indigenous communities as it is for other communities forming less than the state as a whole.  
In reality, however, it particularly affects communities that have an adverse relationship with the 
states in which they live – a description that often applies with particular force to indigenous peoples. 
States are obliged to put in place ‘necessary measures to ensure the safeguarding’ of the intangible 
cultural heritage in their territory (Article 11(a)).  According to Article 2.3, safeguarding in this 
context ‘means measures aimed at ensuring the viability of the intangible cultural heritage, including 
the identification, documentation, research, preservation, protection, promotion, enhancement, 
transmission, particularly through formal and non-formal education, as well as the revitalization of 
the various aspects of such heritage’.  It is arguable that the protection that intangible cultural heritage 
most needs is protection from improper appropriation and use.  While the concept of safeguarding is 
wide enough to encompass such measures, it might be something of an optimistic overstatement to 
read the Convention as mandating such measures.  It is interesting to note that Article 13(d)(ii) 
requires states parties to ‘adopt appropriate legal, technical, administrative and financial measures 
aimed at … ensuring access to the intangible cultural heritage while respecting customary practices 
governing access to specific aspects of such heritage’.  This suggests that states might be obliged to 
limit some types of access, perhaps including appropriation and use, although there is obvious 
ambiguity in the expression ‘customary practices’.  Would this concept be wide enough, for example, 
to limit the type of appropriation by those outside the relevant cultural heritage community that occurs 
through devices, unknown to at least some customary practices, of appropriation in the form of private 
intellectual property?  This seems to be an important question.  Besides anything else, a concomitant 
of ensuring access as part of the rights attaching to cultural heritage must also be to limit privatization.  
So what, then, of claims by the holders of traditional knowledge to limit access through (private) 
intellectual property right devices? 
 
TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE AS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY? 
This takes us to the second underlying premise of the debate, which suggests that protection of 
traditional knowledge falls within the remit of intellectual property law.  The question of the 
relationship between cultural heritage and intellectual property is a particularly fraught one 
(Macmillan 2013; Macmillan 2014a; Macmillan 2014b; Macmillan 2015).  The tendency to elide 
intellectual property rights and cultural heritage rights, including rights to traditional knowledge, has 
been remarkably persistent (Macmillan 2008; Macmillan 2015).  It appears to owe at least something 
to the confusion provoked by their competing invocations of intangibility. Intellectual property rights, 
unlike cultural heritage rights, are never claims to tangible property but rather claims to intangible 
rights (albeit claims that often implicate tangible objects).  Cultural heritage, on the other hand has 
awkward relationship to the distinction between the tangible and the intangible. While it applies to 
both, it is possible to exaggerate the significance of the distinction precisely because what makes a 
tangible thing into cultural heritage is its intangible or symbolic association (Blake 2000; Macmillan 
2013).  Even though these ideas of intangibility are different, the disorientation of the intangible realm 
seems to augment the dangers of confusing, eliding and overlapping cultural heritage and intellectual 
property.  The reason, however, that it is so important to avoid this confusion is because there is a 
fundamental difference between the two that rests on the fact that while cultural heritage is something 
that ‘belongs’ to a community (Macmillan 2015; Macmillan 2016), intellectual property is a rivalrous 
form of private property.  Intellectual property’s character as a fully alienable and transferable private 
right means, furthermore, that it is designed to enable investment in liquid assets, with the ultimate 
effect of promoting the accumulation of capital to the benefit of those best able to reap profits from 
that accumulation.  And, in the context of forms of cultural property, those best able to harvest profits 
off these liquid assets are the multinational corporations engaged in the production and distribution 
of cultural and other knowledge products (Bettig 1996; Macmillan 2006; Macmillan 2008).  Such a 
conception of intellectual property seems to take it a long way from any idea that it is well adapted 
to protecting the cultural heritage, including the traditional knowledge, of a community. 
Even for indigenous peoples, for whom in reality the demand to protect their cultural heritage through 
the use of intellectual property rights is part of a wider agenda concerned with political self-
determination, the transformation of community cultural heritage into a form of private property is 
problematic.  A central reason for recognising community rights to cultural heritage is to defend that 
property from privatisation. While it is clear that indigenous peoples and other communities in the 
global south have been victims of the unauthorised appropriation of their intangible cultural property 
by private interests through the use of intellectual property rights (Slaughter 2011; Macmillan 2013; 
Carpenter, Katyal, Riley 2009), it is at least worth pausing to consider the consequences of using the 
sword as a shield. The argument that underlies claims of the sort contained in the DRIPs, Article 31.1, 
is that the best defence to the cultural threat posed by private intellectual property rights encroaching 
on those cultural rights it to turn those cultural rights into private rights. This argument has an intrinsic 
appeal. Moreover, the post-colonial political context of these claims is not easy to ignore. At the same 
time, it is perhaps this very context that is responsible for the fact that attempts to use intellectual 
property rights in this way have been problematic precisely because of the difficulty in using a private 
right to vindicate a community right. In addition to which it should be recognised that there is a 
significant lack of political interest in changing intellectual property law in order to recognise the 
claims of Indigenous peoples (Blakeney 2006). 
While noting the inherent injustice in the failure to recognise the particular position of indigenous 
peoples, the idea of turning cultural heritage into intellectual property may not be optimal. One result 
of such a process is that the cultural property has to be corralled into the shape of Western intellectual 
property law (Blakeney 2000).  If the item of cultural property is a story, music, or artwork then it 
has to be fitted into copyright law; designs and symbols must fit into the netherworld of the 
relationship between copyright, designs and trademarks; knowledge about local flora and fauna must 
be fitted somewhere into patent law, plants breeder’s rights, geographical indications. This will mean 
that different levels of protection will apply to different types of indigenous cultural property. In short, 
the end result is that occidental intellectual property law comes to constitute indigenous (and other 
non-Western) cultural heritage (Fitzpatrick, Joyce 2007).  In so doing, it may change the shape of that 
heritage in ways that are not necessarily the consequence of the reflexive cultural practice that 
constitutes it.  This seems to be inimical to the very purpose of protecting cultural heritage. 
Traditional knowledge holders in occidental communities do not have exactly this problem.  The 
origins of such communities and of intellectual property law, at least in theory, are not different in a 
cultural sense.  It might also be possible to argue that traditional knowledge holders in occidental 
communities do not have the particular political-legal problem of indigenous peoples because the 
consequence of not being indigenous (in an international law sense) is precisely that one is part of a 
cultural and political community that is also recognised as a state in international law.  Consequently, 
such communities have a place at the international law-making table, giving them the capacity to 
influence legal outcomes that protect their rights to, in this case, their traditional knowledge.  
However, when it comes to the protection of community rights in traditional knowledge, it is easy to 
exaggerate the significance of statehood.  This is because, in general, even non-indigenous traditional 
knowledge tends to belong to communities forming less than the state as a whole – that is, 
communities within a state rather than communities comprising a state.  The political problems for 
such communities in having their particular rights recognised and pursued at the international level 
by the state may have something in common with the political situation in this respect of indigenous 
peoples.  The difference may be that the request for protection of traditional knowledge does not have 
the same political significance.  However, in the end one common problem that all communities – 
indigenous and non-indigenous – share when it comes to protecting their traditional knowledge is the 
difficulty of sustaining a community right using an individualistic private property right. 
But if we don’t protect traditional knowledge as a form of private property, that is as a form of 
intellectual property, what should we do with it?  Should we put it in the cultural commons and treat 
it as a type of common goods? 
 
TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE IN THE CULTURAL COMMONS? 
The idea that we should leave cultural heritage, including traditional knowledge, in the cultural 
commons derives considerable support from a vast movement, scholarly and political, that lauds free 
access to culture and tends to be suspicious of any attempts at what it regards as propertization of 
cultural artefacts, especially intangible cultural artefacts. The much debated idea of the cultural 
commons or public domain is primarily located in a concern to safeguard community interests in 
cultural stuff (Boyle 2008; Brown 2003; Hemmungs Wirtén 2008; Holder, Flessas 2008; Mezey 
2007). The method by which this safeguarding is said to take place is by using the cultural commons 
or public domain as a defence against private appropriation. One of the limitations of this concept, 
however, is that it raises more difficult questions about how to protect communities from other forms 
of inappropriate uses of their cultural property. The problem is that the unregulated commons or 
public domain provides no legal architecture for the vindication of specific community interests in 
cultural property (Macmillan 2010).  In this sense the unregulated commons is like a defence without 
a fence – a space that is defined by absence, that is the absence of intellectual property rights, and so 
a space created by intellectual property itself.  All this makes the unprotected exposure of cultural 
property in the commons problematic.  As a result, the discourse of the commons has been cogently 
criticised on the ground that it has the capacity to amount to what is effectively a second, post-colonial 
misappropriation of the culture of indigenous peoples (Bowrey, Anderson 2009; cf Mezey 2007).  
While this particular addition of insult to injury requires specific recognition, the likelihood that the 
issue has a wider application, and might also apply to non-indigenous communities, should be 
recognised (Macmillan 2014b).  In response, it is - at the very least - clear that the concept of cultural 
heritage, residing outside the scope of traditional private property rights, requires legal architecture. 
While it might be going too far to describe the protection granted to intangible cultural heritage under 
the 2003 UNESCO Convention as tantamount to leaving that heritage in the unregulated commons, 
it also seems that, for reasons that have already been explored above, the protection conferred by this 
Convention cannot do all the things that a real community right to its cultural heritage might imply.  
Where, then, can we find the legal architecture to protect the rights of a community to its own cultural 
heritage, its own traditional knowledge, without constructing private property fences and without 
denying the collective rights of the community, even when that community forms less than the 
community of a state as a whole?  This is far from being an easy question to answer.  Such architecture 
must to be more than just a vague notion defined by the absence of positive property rights, whether 
private or state-owned. It needs to provide safeguards against the unauthorised appropriation and use 
of cultural heritage. It needs to transcend outdated thinking that divides rights between public (as in 
state) and private rights holders, by recognising community interests. It also needs to recognise that 
people often have more than one community identity.  If all this was not already a tall enough order, 
it also needs to avoid the type of essentialism that suggests cultural (and political) closure. In the 
context of cultural stuff, this type of closure provokes anxiety because it appears to fly in the face of 
traditions of cultural and creative interchange that have made the world (for better or worse) what it 
is today. 
 
TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE AS CULTURAL PROPERTY? 
One possible approach to this conundrum is the development of a concept of cultural property 
belonging to a community that is capable of providing a type of legal counterweight the notion of 
private property embedded in the concept of intellectual property.  Aside from some civil law regimes 
that recognise a concept of state-owned cultural property, this is not a concept known to occidental 
legal systems.  On the other hand, it is notable that outside positivist legal scholarship the expression 
is widely used.  Nevertheless, it should be said from the outset that, while the development of such a 
concept has much to offer, there are a number of good arguments that can be advanced against such 
a concept and that should, at least, be taken into account in the current context. 
A pervasive argument against any concept of community-owned cultural property is that the concept 
of ‘property’ will always be problematic precisely because it has a clear legal, political and economic 
significance that is at odds with its use in conjunction with the qualifier ‘cultural’ (Prott, O’Keefe 
1992; Blake 2000).  There are various aspects to this argument that merit further enquiry.  First, there 
is the problem that the legal concept of property is not sufficiently broad to cover everything that is 
intended to be encompassed in the concept of cultural property (Blake 2000; Flessas 2003; Prott, 
O’Keefe 1992). For instance, the property concept does not extend to a wide range of intangibles, 
such as spiritual beliefs (Blakeney 2013) or values that bind together and regulate the relationship 
between persons, communities and tangibles (Coombe 1997; Prott, O’Keefe 1992; Strathern 1999).  
This is, of course, also a consequence of the fact that when we talk about property in a legal sense 
we, here at the self-declared centre or the world, are generally talking about a Western concept that 
embodies Western values. Apart from its scope, perhaps the Western value that is most bothersome 
in the context of cultural property is the concept of rivalrous ownership and possession that is Western 
property’s special bedfellow (Mezey 2004).  It is not clear that ownership and possession are always 
appropriate concepts in this context. This is partly because they may not reflect that way that all 
cultures think about their cultural property (Brown 2003; Coombe 1997; Macmillan 2015; Prott, 
O’Keefe 1992; Strathern 1999).  But also because, even in the Western context, they trail in their 
wake other values and practices that might be thought to be undesirable. Rivalrous property rights are 
at the centre of a market-based thinking that has shown itself to be capable in the neo-liberal period 
of eclipsing any notion of public (as in non-private) good (Christodoulidis 2013).  In the specific 
context of tangible cultural property, the results of this are evident in the thriving private international 
market for the sale of cultural artefacts (Prott, O’Keefe 1992; Carpenter, Katyal, Riley 2009).  It also 
seems to be implicated in the practices of museums that claim possessive property rights in their 
exhibits, which have limited or even prevented return of sensitive cultural objects (Flessas 2013). 
In the face of these arguments, it is clear that if we want to employ a concept of cultural property then 
it has to be one that is somehow divorced, or at least separated, from these traditional Western 
property notions. One way of doing this might be to conceive property in this context, not as a relation 
of ownership but rather one of membership (Keenan 2014).  This conception of property reinforces 
the idea of cultural stuff as being intrinsically connected to identity. In fact, referring to property 
rather than heritage may avoid ‘the privileging of preservation’ (Flessas 2003, p. 1091), which has 
been at the heart of Western concepts of heritage (Flessas 2003; Flessas 2013; Macmillan 2013; 
Simpson 2001; Yu 2008), at the expense of a dynamic relationship with identity. This type of re-
conception also moves us away from a strict division in ownership between public (as in state) and 
private property, which both operate to exclude community interests in ways which vary depending 
upon the community in question (Keenan 2014; Prott, O’Keefe 1992). At the same time, the use of 
the word has an important political significance retaining the ideas of ‘embattled space’ (Flessas 2003, 
p. 1085) and that property itself is productive of community (Keenan 2014; Gibson 2006). Using the 
concept of property here, instead of heritage, does not only make the conflict between cultural 
property and other types of property evident and unavoidable, both politically and legally.  It also 
allows us to think about whether property concepts themselves, so well-known to the law, can be used 
to produce a liberatory tool that can be fitted into or recognised by the law. 
The idea that property, or property concepts, might have liberatory or even subversive (Keenan 2014) 
potential has seductive power, even if (like all subversive ideas in their early stages) it requires careful 
articulation and constant defence.  And certainly, as has already been noted, the concept of cultural 
property, residing outside the scope of traditional private property rights, requires legal architecture.  
The discussion below examines three possible models for such a form of cultural property.  These are 
the stewardship model proposed by Carpenter, Katyal and Riley (2009), the idea of cultural property 
as res universitatis, and the potential uses of the existing legal concept of geographical indications. 
 
Stewardship Model 
The proposal of Carpenter, Katyal and Riley for a stewardship model of property, which specifically 
aims to vindicate the cultural property claims of indigenous peoples, seeks to find a liberatory use of 
the property paradigm that transcends its current narrow legal focus on private rights, and on the 
distinction between private property and some form of publicly held property. Effectively, this 
stewardship model uses the property paradigm without replicating those aspects of traditional 
property law that have already been identified as problematic in the context of cultural stuff. 
Theoretically, the model is located in Radin’s work (1982; 1996) on the constitutive relationship 
between property and personhood, in which she argues that some forms of property are constitutive 
of identity in ways that take them out of the normal processes of the market place.  To use Radin’s 
work in this way, however, requires a transition from her emphasis on the relationship between 
individual personhood and property to a concern with the relationship between peoplehood and 
property that is implicated in the idea of a group claim.  Carpenter, Katyal and Riley are fully aware 
that arguments about community rights often appear to be teetering on the edge of the type of 
essentialism that suggests cultural (and political) closure.  For this reason, their model builds in a 
notion of community rights that is capable of resting on more than one level of identity thus moving 
away from an essentialist position. 
Whether the elegant and persuasive use of the property concept embedded in the stewardship model, 
which is intended to address the situation of indigenous peoples, can function as well outside the 
context of indigenous cultural property claims is open to question. The fact, as they note, that the 
identity and claims of indigenous peoples as a community are recognisable within the legal 
environment of many states in which indigenous communities live is, ironically, a reaction to the 
dispossession and loss of political autonomy visited upon them in the colonial and post-colonial 
periods. However, it is this very environment of legally recognised identity, in the context of multi-
layered identities, that may make the stewardship model functional. Further, their suggestion that the 
use of the property paradigm may be a specific response to the massive land dispossession suffered 
by indigenous peoples everywhere may be interpreted as providing limited support for a paradigm of 
cultural property outside the context of the cultural property of indigenous peoples. Finally, the 
particular treatment of indigenous peoples in the post-colonial period, especially the denial of political 
autonomy, may be a ground for arguing that models designed to protect their cultural property are 
not, in any case, necessarily appropriate for all communities or groups. 
 
Res universitatis 
If the proposal for a new legal form does not convincingly resolve a perceived problem then perhaps 
it makes some sense to consider what forms already exist, or existed.  Given that, in this case, the 
perceived problem arises from the unacceptable closure of intellectual (or other private) property as 
a form of protection for cultural heritage and the problematic openness of the commons, then perhaps 
it is worth having a closer look at the origins of the commons in intellectual space.  The idea of the 
commons, at least so far as it has made its presence felt in intellectual property scholarship, is heavily 
dependent on principles of Roman law governing physical space (Rose 2003; Macmillan 2010).  
Some of the conceptual problems that arose with respect to physical space in Roman law have also 
emerged in the modern notion of intellectual space.  At the same time, the metaphorical existence of 
modern intellectual space seems to lack some of the complexity of its forbear in physical space. 
The relevant Roman law principles recognised various dimensions of nonexclusive – but not 
necessarily public – property (Rose 2003).  The most well-used of these so far as intellectual 
property/commons debate are concerned are res communes and res publicae.  The former referring 
to things incapable by their nature of being exclusively owned, while the latter referring to things 
open to the public by operation of law.  These seem to have translated into the modern day debate 
about property in intellectual space in the specific form of the concepts of the commons and the public 
domain.  The fact that these expressions are often used interchangeably is probably not much of a 
surprise given that the Romans had a similar problem with res communes and res publicae, which 
reflected the modern day tendency ‘to mix up normative arguments for “publicness” with naturalistic 
arguments about the impossibility of owning certain resources’ (Rose 2003, p. 96).  This confusion 
between the commons and the public domain, res communes and res publicae, has done nothing to 
simplify the epistemological basis of the dichotomy between intellectual property and intellectual 
public space.  It has also tended to conceal the fact that, traced back to their Roman law origins, 
neither of these concepts seems to provide a particularly strong basis for a vibrant public or non-
exclusive intellectual space in today’s world (Macmillan 2010).  More than this, in the present 
context, it has been responsible for a tendency to simplify the notion of the commons so that we are 
left with a sharp division between closure and openness that seems to admits no shades of meaning 
or complications of form.  Besides impoverishing the debate, this also fails to recognise the 
complexities of the Roman law governing property in physical space.  In particular, as Rose (2003) 
points out, it ignores Roman law concepts that might be of particular use in resolving currents 
dilemmas, such as the one with which this chapter is concerned. 
Res universitatis, which was one of the categories of non-exclusive property under Roman law, 
appears to have particular potential in the current context.  Translated into modern terms, it refers to 
a type of property that surrounds the productive activities of a group.  Form the outside those activities 
are protected by a shell or shield of property rights, but inside activities are not constrained by 
property relations.  The result is that inside the shell there is freedom from property restraints: freedom 
of speech, freedom to innovate and create, freedom to produce knowledge, freedom of use, freedom 
of to exchange ideas, freedom to develop the ideas of others.  In intellectual space, this form preserves 
productive synergies within the relevant group or community while maintaining the incentive to 
produce such synergies through the exercise of rights against outsiders.  As the name suggests, this 
type of bounded community is commonly reflected in the activities of academic and scholarly 
groupings (Rose 2003).  It may also describe the way in which members of traditional and indigenous 
communities produce innovations, knowledge and other types of creative expressions. 
One of the implicit premises of this chapter is that intellectual property law has difficulty in 
recognising these types of creative or innovative communities.  The primary reason for this is that 
intellectual property law is always anxious to identify the owner of the relevant right, be it copyright’s 
author or patent law’s inventor.  In doing this, it is likely to disregard many contributions from the 
relevant community and to muddle up concepts of origination, ownership and use.  Intellectual 
property does enjoy a very limited ability to recognise the concept of the bounded creative or 
innovative community through the devices of joint authorship and joint invention, which it transforms 
into joint ownership.  However, these concepts are so limited in law that they can rarely do justice to 
the dynamic relations of a creative or innovative community (Chon 1996; Rose 1998).  And it might 
also be the case, as Rose (2003) argues, that the successful use of these existing intellectual property 
concepts to nourish a vibrant creative or innovative community depends upon an unrealistic degree 
of goodwill, if not goodness, on the part of all the members of the relevant community. 
How many of these problems in recognising and governing the relevant community might also affect 
other property devices, such as that comprised in the concept of res universitatis?  Certainly, any 
concept of community falling short of legal recognition as a state in international law is, I think it 
must be taken as read, likely to pose a challenge to identification by law.  Communities, despite being 
recognised in political theory as constituting the common political identity that forms the basis of the 
nation (Anderson 2006), and perhaps also the common cultural identity that precedes a common 
political identity, have traditionally received little formal attention in international law precisely 
because their identity has been submerged into that of the nation-state.  Nevertheless, as was noted in 
relation to the 2003 UNESCO Convention, the word “community” has started to creep into 
international legal instruments.  The Convention does not seek to define the concept of community.  
Nor does it attempt to indicate expressly how a community might be recognised by the law, although 
the reflexive relationship between community and cultural heritage in the definition of “intangible 
cultural heritage” in Article 2.1 gives some indication of a possible approach to this issue. 
Legal accounts of community, of course, exist.  Despite the paucity (both quantitative and qualitative) 
of references to the concept of community in international law instruments, it is clear there is a 
substantial engagement with this concept in national legal systems.  Given the reflexive relationship 
between community and cultural heritage, which is acknowledged in the 2003 UNESCO Convention, 
it is not surprising to discover that this engagement sometimes takes place in the cultural heritage 
context.  National law recognition of the cultural heritage of indigenous peoples or of ethnic or 
linguistic minorities are examples of this.  To some extent, these types of rights reflect obligations 
(actual or hortatory) in international law even though their origins might not be directly attributable 
to such obligations.  However, there are also other well-known examples in national law of the 
recognition of community and associated community rights, where community is less than the public 
at large.  It is common, for example, for legal systems to recognise community rights in property 
based on customary use (Clarke 2015).  An interesting variation on this is the recognition, nationally 
and internationally, of certain rights associated with the marking of products made in a certain 
geographical location (Aylwin, Coombe 2013).  With this in mind, this chapter now turns to examine 
whether the concept of geographical indications might offer a useful form of protection for traditional 
knowledge. 
 
Traditional knowledge as a geographical indication? 
The concept of protected geographical indications, which already exists at the levels of both national 
and international law thanks to the WTO Agreement on the Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property, could provide – strangely – a model for the protection of traditional knowledge and other 
forms of intangible cultural heritage.  This is because, exceptionally, it grants a collective right rather 
than a private individual right.  Specifically, a recognised geographical indication gives a right to 
every person that sells products coming from a certain geographical region and having particular 
qualities on account of that provenance to apply the indication to their products. 
It seems to be the case that traditional knowledge often has a geographical dimension in the sense 
that it is formed around communities in a particular place who have developed traditional knowledge 
and uses as part of the dynamic that holds the community together.  Perhaps, then, it would be possible 
to adjust the already existing concept of geographical indications to protect at least traditional 
knowledge, if not also other cultural heritage of a specific community.  Perhaps this seems a bit too 
strange: this chapter has posed the problem of traditional knowledge protection as lying somewhere 
in the conflict zone between intellectual property rights and cultural property rights.  If there is 
something anomalous in the idea of returning, in the end, to a form of protection that is recognised as 
an intellectual property then that might suggest that the chapter posed the question wrongly.  
However, it is more likely that the real anomaly is the concept of geographical indications, located in 
the intellectual property camp, but in reality a community right.  In the end the important thing is that 
such a right would seem to be capable of responding to many of the needs identified in this chapter.  
It could control the unauthorised appropriation and use of a community’s cultural heritage, including 
its traditional knowledge; by recognising communities that form less than the state as a whole, it is 
capable of transcending the problematic and antiquated idea that property must be either public (in 
the sense of belonging to the state) or private; and it could provide safeguards against the dangers of 
a type of exclusivity that is oppressive and limits cultural interchange and development. 
 
CONCLUSION: RECOGNISING THE TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE COMMUNITY? 
The problem of recognising a community that forms less than the state as a whole will always be with 
us as we seek to find a way to protect the traditional knowledge community.  However, that problem 
is not an insuperable one.  In confronting this issue, it is necessary to recognise that community comes 
before the law, which is to say that it cannot be regarded as constituted by law.  Nor can community 
be contained in legal accounts of its existence or life (Christodoulidis 1998).  That community 
interacts with such accounts does not change the fundamental proposition that, as Christodoulidis 
argues, community can converge ‘around a political/ethical understanding both capable of upholding 
a commitment, and dynamic, always potentially disruptable internally; and with no measure of 
authority, force, persuasion and violence capable of upholding it externally’ (Christodoulidis 1998, 
p. 237).  Since law is not constitutive of community the pivotal question here is not whether we can 
find a basis in law for delineating a community, which might then lay claim to certain community 
rights.  Rather what we may need to find are indicia in existing legal accounts around which to build 
a concept of community that might then be the carrier of certain cultural heritage rights and 
obligations in law. 
The types of (overlapping) indicia that seem to be important in national systems as they relate to 
communities that form less than population of the state as a whole are: common political identity; 
common ethnic identity; common language; common religious identity; common geographical 
location; common sustenance practices; common history.  As will be evident, with the possible 
exception of common language (Anderson 2006; Hobsbawm 2013) and common religion 
(Hobsbawm 2013), these are all also indicia of the type of communities that constitute nation states 
in international law.  All these rather specific ‘legal’ indicia of community in fact draw on certain 
foundational concepts that are generally identified as being essential to the formation of community 
in any context, whether directly mediated by law or not.  It is, arguably, these foundational concepts 
to which we should return in a quest to identify communities that should be regarded as enjoying 
cultural heritage rights or claims. 
It seems that the central foundational concepts around which all these more specific indicia of 
community rotate are identification and memory, which are reflexively linked to one another.  For 
Anderson, communities (with the possible exception of ‘primordial villages of face-to-face contact’ 
(Anderson 2006, p. 6)) are always imagined.  By this he means not that they are fake or false, but 
rather that they are created by the imagination, that is by being imagined.  Accordingly, he observes 
that ‘[c]ommunities are to be distinguished not by their falsity/genuineness, but by the style in which 
they are imagined’ (Anderson 2006, p. 6).  Anderson’s classic account of community is focussed on 
the way in which community produces nation, and with it nationalism.  Nevertheless, his observations 
on the formation of community also seem pertinent in the context of communities forming less than 
the nation-state as a whole.  These observations do much to enrich the foundational relation of 
identification and memory.  There are three, in particular, that go to the heart of how community is 
imagined.  First, Anderson notes the ‘deep horizontal comradeship’ (Anderson 2006, p. 7) that 
characterizes the imagined community – something that might also be referred to as solidarity.  
Secondly, he places emphasis on the temporal aspect of community, ‘this sense of parallelism or 
simultaneity’ (Anderson 2006, p. 188).  The temporal dimensions here are both horizontal and 
vertical.  Horizontal because comradeship and solidarity carry with them some notion of a shared 
temporal space.  Vertical because if memory is critical to the imagined community then this implies 
a shared concept of the community’s history and its temporal progression.  Following on from this, 
the third aspect of Anderson’s study that has particular resonance in the present context is exactly this 
question of how a community imagines its relationship with its own past (Macmillan 2016).  The 
urgent task now is to find meaningful legal mechanisms that can recognise these communities and 
give them the capacity to protect their cultural heritage in ways that are appropriate to their 
community and that, with any luck, can enrich us all. 
